Our latest podcast offers a law enforcement officer's point of view on cybercrime investigations and incident response, featuring Texas-based cybercrime detective and managing director of Secure Ideas Response Team Nick Selby with hosts Will Gragido and Thomas Fischer. Tune in below or subscribe via iTunes to receive our bi-monthly podcasts automatically.

Highlights from this episode include:

• 1:30 - Current trends observed from Nick's work in cybercrime investigations and law enforcement: skimming, business email compromise, help desk fraud, and more
• 6:30 - The challenges facing law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating cybercrime
• 10:45 - How law enforcement can drive cybersecurity awareness in communities
• 15:30 - The intersection of digital crime and physical crime
• 23:00 - The role of incident response in cybercrime investigations and remediation

Intro/outro music: "Groovy Baby" by Jason Shaw, licensed under CC BY 3.0 US

Transcript

[0:00:08.9] WG: Welcome to Digital Guardian’s podcast. My name is Will Gragido, I’m one of your hosts. Joining today across the Atlantic is Thomas Fisher. Thomas, take a moment to say hi.

[0:00:19.0] TF: Hi everybody, it’s Thomas back for another episode of the podcast. It’s good to be back.

[0:00:24.4] WG: All right, and with us today is Mr. Nick Selby. A sworn Texas police detective who specializes in the investigations of cyber-criminal activity, in addition to being the managing director of Secure Ideas Response Team. Nick, thanks for joining us today, why don’t you go ahead and say hi to the folks on the audience.

[0:00:43.6] NS: Hey folks out in the audience, how are you?

[0:00:45.9] WG: Awesome. Today, we’re very pleased to join us today. Nick is again a sworn police officer, detective in fact, managing director for a very active instant response team that works internationally, an author, prolific author who I’ve had the pleasure of working with and coauthoring a book with and just an all around wonderful guy so Nick, really, we’re pleased to have you today, thank you for joining us.

[0:01:08.6] NS: Thanks Will.

[0:01:10.1] WG: Excellent. Today we’re going to be talking about cyber-criminal activity, trends within the cyber-criminal underground, things that we’re seeing being reported by law enforcement agencies such as the FBI in their most recent IC3 report and then a whole bunch of things related to this domain.

Nick, why don’t you go ahead and tell us what you’ve been up to and what you’re working on and what you’re working on and what you think is interesting and what you’re seeing that folks at home and the listening audience might find interesting?

[0:01:36.5] NS: Well, I think what I’ve been working on and what the FBI’s been working on are different things or at least, I work at a subset of what they work on. What we’ve seen in our agency in North Central Texas and I can speak – I think I can speak generally for agencies in North Central Texas because I am in a group of more than 950 detectives in the more than 200 cities up in North Central Texas and we share a lot of information.

What we’ve been seeing has been, I would say, notable increases in addition to things like more sophisticated skimmers and better made and more thoughtfully crafted skimmers, we’ve also been seeing a lot of business email take overs and compromises and a lot of help desk fraud, that’s kind of – When somebody comes to the police and says “help, I’ve been plundered,” that’s really what they’re usually complaining about.

Some flavor of “somebody’s gotten into my bank account and created a wire transfer or outbound ACH of X thousand dollars and I’d like to get it back please,” that’s usually what brings them into the police. The other thing of course that I work on quite a bit is child exploitation videos, child pornography investigations and those I would say the rate at which they come in is fairly steady and you know, disappointingly distressingly high at any given time.

We usually have a couple of those going at any given time. When I look at what the FBI is saying, they’re kind of having what I just said but a lot more complaints and I think what I’d love to talk about is you know, the fact that the FBI is the self-proclaimed lead agency for investigating cyber, they took that name for themselves early, they aggressively positioned themselves with the American people as the lead agency and I have been saying for years that it’s not that they’re not up to it because every individual person who works for the FBI who does this stuff is absolutely a rockstar.

It’s just that there just aren’t enough for them and there’s enough money for it so when we look at the IC3 internet crime reports from 2016, we see that in the last year, they received 298,728 complaints about cybercrime, reported losses, more than 1.3 billion dollars and they opened 37 investigations. That’s a pretty huge delta between reported and investigated and you know, I think that a lot of it is that when people call, they’re very non-specific or they’re reporting crimes that are sort of low threshold, a few hundred bucks here, a couple of thousand bucks there.

It’s not really enough to get a federal agent to come over but also it’s because, they just don’t have the agents to investigate all of the stuff that’s being reported.

[0:04:44.7] TF: I mean Nick, that’s really interesting number, I mean, you know, I’m based in the UK and we have, so the UK’s slightly different, it’s not like the Met police is in charge, all of it. There’s a specific division that’s in charge of cybercrimes and it’s been given to the national crime agency so there is a focus group that deals with that problem.

Now, each police division also has the ability to deal and handle cyber crime locally but we run into the same problem here in the UK, there’s a wealth of, call them just incidents just to be generic but there’s wealth of incidents and they’re overwhelmed and it’s you know, maybe they could take care of a lot more incidents but there aren’t enough people and I think that’s probably the same problem that the FBI is having.

Seeing the size of the US, population versus size, et cetera. You come to a point, where are the resources right? Where are the resources with the specialized skills and I know I’ve spoken to a lot of people and I have a few friends that are actually in the police force here in the UK and they do work on cybercrime but their main setback is that they don’t have the resources.

To get the resources, it’s really hard because they need to train them and getting people trained up is actually quite tough right? Because you need to have, you need to put them into a specific set of skills. You also need at some point in time, they have to come from that background of computer science maybe or incident response or forensics or some kind of – they have to have some kind of background to make it easier to get them up to speed.

I’m assuming you’re seeing the same thing right?

[0:06:31.9] NS: I am, you know, in name and in concept, it’s rather similar over here so the FBI does have a cyber division and that cyber division is the group that is responsible for investigating. Now, other agencies at the federal law enforcement level do a fair bit of cyber investigations. The secret service has an electronic crimes task force that’s mainly tasked at this point with skimmers.

Anything to do with money supply right? Because the secret service does money, that’s their bag and you know, a bunch of other agencies do little bits and pieces of this and that, here and there and now and then. There’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States and that includes a lot of, the 50 primary state law enforcement agencies, all the county sheriffs and then all the local police departments.

That’s just – and of course there’s tribal police as well. It’s a huge number, just a couple of demographic statistics about the way it works in America about 85% of American law enforcement agencies have 24 or fewer officers. The thing you mentioned of getting people trained up with 800,000 cops or so in the United States.

It’s really difficult, the resources aren’t there and you’re also right about the kind of background that’s needed. I don’t think that people need to be super geeks but there is a sort of a general proclivity towards understanding how computer systems work that you would want to get and frankly, that’s just not the recruitment base that law enforcement has traditionally had.

Even the younger officers have some real issues with just understanding why is a fraud on eBay different from a fraud at, a more traditional fraud and these conceptual issues are very tough. You know, everybody knows what it’s like to get sold a new TV set and when you get it home, you open up the box and it’s a TV screen poking through the box and it’s held up by a stick and there’s a brick in the box right?

That’s like an old con. If you buy something fake on eBay, it should be the same thing but in fact, for the investigation, it really isn’t. Everything about how we start to investigate those crimes is really different from the traditional way. I mean, if you look back and go to a 10,000-foot view, yeah, they look very similar. But, when you get down into the specifics of it. It’s really kind of difficult. So finding people who actually have that temperament, have that ability and have the training is really, really hard.

I don’t think it’s necessarily a UK versus US problem as much as it’s just a man power problem and also look, cybercrime, it’s easy, it’s low risk, it’s high reward.

[0:09:23.5] TF: Pays well.

[0:09:23.6] NS: Why wouldn’t you do it if you were a criminal?

[0:09:27.1] WG: Exactly.

[0:09:28.1] NS: It’s very popular with the children.

[0:09:40.8] TF: Actually, I got a few thought processes around from what we were discussing. Maybe later we’ll come back to the skimmers because I have some questions around the skimmers.

If we carry on in that thought process, the manpower and what if we take the problem and move it to a more of an awareness campaign and trying to get more involved with local communities and teaching them how to be more aware of what’s going on.

You know, I mentioned to you earlier in the PR discussion where I was actually at an IWSA meeting yesterday and we were discussed and there was a presentation by one of the cyber directors for the mayor of London and they’ve been building this outreach program called, I think it’s called Digital London or something like that where they’ve actually trained up some of the local police officers to go out to their high streets, to the local small businesses and explain them the risks of using IT systems and the risk they could be facing in terms of cybercrime.

What do you think of that type of concept? Do you think it’s something that could actually ultimately help reduce that number of incidents the police forces are trying to handle?

[0:11:04.4] NS: I do, I think it’s really important. I’ve done that, my department hired me and that was the first thing that I was doing. Going around to local businesses, to Chamber of Commerce and talking about how to recognize different kinds of attacks, how to recognize, organize retail criminals who are using stolen credit cards.

How to see when something looks a little bit strange and what the risks are to people who are running point of fail systems. A lot of times, things that we would –in the information security industry think are really obvious, are really not obvious. I think someone’s got to be doing this kind of outreach and education. I think that you know, if we look at what the PCIDSS standard actually did was that more than anything, it effectively transferred the risk of transactions over to the merchants themselves.

The merchants are not getting the training that they need. They’re not able to identify problems early enough to get help. One of the most frustrating things that happens to me when I get called in to something is when I get there, I’m told, and I guess this actually goes over to my incident response hat as well.

You know, “yeah, I had this problem so I wiped all the computers and started over.” Great. I have no evidence and I have no way of doing any real investigation and that’s kind of – that comes down to education but I also think that the officers themselves need cyber incident handling training.

I know Texas really is very good at this, Texas is now rolling out a certified Cyber Crime Investigation certificate and they have at least since 2010 had been pushing cyber incident handling if only to make it so that the officers don’t screw things up when they get on to the scene.

I’ll also say that it doesn’t really scale. Once we gather computers, once we collect digital evidence a lot, our forensics capabilities are incredibly limited. It is not uncommon to wait a year, six months minimum to get back any kind of response from forensics on a device and most of the sort of journeyman work a day, garden variety, cybercrime for money gets the back seat to things like child pornography.

You know, it can be a long wait to get back any type of digital evidence. We’re just a good decade behind the mainstream and how law enforcement looks at cyber incidents when compared to real life which is crazy because if you got mugged and hit over the head and somebody took your wallet, it’s not like the cops could say, “gosh, that’s too tough, we don’t do that.” But they’re doing that with cyber.

[0:13:53.7] WG: Yeah, it’s an interesting challenge for law enforcement I think and to your point, I think that though the FBI certainly was early on in the game with respect to kind of claiming that title as being an authoritive voice with respect to cyber-criminal activity.

The breadth and depth of that space on a global playing field is challenging even for the most advanced law enforcement agency. When you circuit break that down, you start to look at things on a more local scale, you can absolutely see why it is problematic for local law and regional law enforcement and then of course even at the national level. Nick, you know, you touched on a couple of things right?

You touched on the prevalence of skimmers right? Credit card skimmers are really one of the oldest scams and low hanging fruit type of to your point, cybercriminal actions that one can get involved with and it’s certainly prevalent and in fact, we had one of our neighborhood at a local gas station as a matter of fact.

Just recently the Village sent out a note about it and of course you talked about various forms of fraud which is always been problematic. I know you talked about some of the more insidious sides of cybercriminal activity which I think that most people in our profession probably don’t understand the intersection points or the conflation points between X scale true organized criminal entities who endeavor into cyber-criminal elements or take advantage of cybercriminal TTP’s in order to conduct their business such as those who endeavor in human exploitation and trafficking.

How those organizations at the same time are also actively involved in things like broad global scale fraud. Bought in that activity financial scams. Can you talk about some of those intersection points that you’re aware of or that you’ve seen from your experience.

Certainly we’ve written about some of those in the past and kind of spent hours and hours, countless hours talking about. What can you share about how that global activity right? And the nuances that are present and those conflation points, those intersection points actually emanate and can have an impact on John Smith in Central Texas or in Central Illinois or parts of the UK or wherever they may find themselves?

[0:16:09.4] NS: I think the most obvious one and I’ve spoken about this at some length because it just keeps happening just like skimmers. Just like income tax refund fraud right? When you get something good and you keep getting away with it and you keep making money at it, it’s really kind of difficult to get people to switch away from that and that’s kind of why skimmers are still out there.

Because they work. I think that when I explain to law enforcement administrators and city business leaders sort of what does this mean to me, I keep coming back to organized retail crime as the nexus of digital and the real world. Organized retail crime is massive in scale.

It is certainly global, it is targeting the deepest pockets there are and it’s got the advantage of being able to launder stolen money and turn it in to, launder stolen and digital money and turn it into actual real-world goods or money as part of the process.

You know, if you think about groups that are looking to get into point of sales systems, to get into credit card and steal credit cards, steal payment information, duplicate that and then load gangs which literally drive the US interstate every single day in large rental trucks with you know, 15 people. Each of them armed with credit cards that had been stolen and you know, reprogrammed on to anything with a magnetic strip, anything that can be used and of course, you know the chip stuff is still taking a big dent into this but it’s still out there with the magnetic stripe readers, going into stores and buying as much as they can of basically anything that they can and then just going to the next mall down the road, filling up the truck and then selling all that stuff somewhere. That’s a really easy to understand way of monetizing stolen digital assets and it’s worth a lot of money to the bad guys but it’s also a huge hit to the retailers and the strangest things get stolen.

The strangest things are sought after, things, Crest whitening strips is a huge one. Tide laundry detergent, diapers, diabetic testing strips, these are all things that are hugely valuable to criminals and they’ll target them in any way that they can either just smash and grab or targeted theft or buying them and buying them with stolen payment stuff and then selling them. It’s kind of crazy but that is the most obvious intersection that we see.

[0:19:02.1] WG: And I guess you could say that here in the States at one point in time other elements that would have been at play in a similar faction would have been like the illegal cigarette trade and the subsequent crafting of stolen razor blades, things of that nature, so things that people don’t necessarily understand would be valuable on the street and that do in fact have some kind of connected connection to cyber fit.

[0:19:23.9] NS: Now what is it, you know our friend Eric Olsen has said in the past that on the black market cigarettes are worth more than gold and toner ink is worth more than platinum.

[0:19:32.9] TF: Fantastic isn’t it? Yeah.

[0:19:35.7] WG: Yeah, I believe that too. We have similar problems in Europe where there is still no real normalization of cigarette prices. They are still cheaper to get cigarettes in Spain than it is in the UK so you know you have to –

[0:19:53.1] NS: Not for long, Brexit boy!

[0:19:56.9] TF: That’s not going to change, it has nothing to do with Brexit.

[0:20:00.2] NS: A little bit, what is it? UK custom stops, I can’t. It’s an insane number like 30 million cigarettes a day is stopped by UK customs.

[0:20:08.4] TF: Yeah and I mean that’s completely independent of Brexit. It’s ridiculous. Let’s not go down that road because that road is a really bad one to go down.

[0:20:18.7] NS: Well right but the other one I’d say, so I just had a case with a non-profit that was scammed in the sort of traditional cyber/real world scam where somebody called and they had done some reconnaissance. They knew that the director was out of the country. They sent an email to the assistant saying that they were the director with a business email compromise and got the assistants to make a transfer of $25,000.

We have a woman in our city right now who fell for the customer support call and by the time the bad guy was done transferring money from her savings to her checking then saying, “Oops I deposited money in your checking. Can you please get me cash cards from Walmart and send me the numbers for them” by the time she figured it all out she was down almost $10,000. These are the kind of things that hit every day people.

They are not aware of it until they notice something happening and then there was another one which was really, this happened to us a couple of years ago. Somebody was stealing from a city councilman which is why we got involved and we tracked back a bunch of things. We found the actual people who are doing it but one of the places where the IP led us was to some guy. Some 75 year old retired guy who sat at his home watching porn all day and smoking grass and minding his own business.

And he was watching free porn and he got his computer on and turned into a little piece of a botnet and little did he know until six cops showed up at his door and seized his stuff that this was going on. It could really be inconvenient when law enforcement shows up and does that. I think there’s a lot of real world intersections when cybercrime meets the real world that are none obvious but when they happen to you, you sure do notice and it’s a huge impact.

[0:22:20.8] TF: Yeah, we forget the aspect right? It’s ultimately there is going to be one point in time some kind of physical aspect. I mean in the enterprise world, we tend to forget that because you mentioned the fishing case. I think we see regularly I think once or twice a month of fishing email going to one of the finance guys pretending to be our CEO asking them to make a transfer but we’re security conscious.

We have the processes in place to actually try and get around, to stop our people from doing something wrong. When you are a small business or when you are alone and you are trying to do your business and you are overwhelmed you don’t see that coming right? You’ve forgotten that there’s other ways to check what is going on but yeah, the physical world is, the best way to get rid of that money is get it back into the physical world right?

When it used to be the money laundering aspects, how do you launder digital money essentially become physical?

[0:23:24.1] NS: Yeah and when we go to small businesses, when I put my private sector I hat on and we get calls from, obviously everybody in the incident response world was getting a lot of calls about ransomware most of them we have to turn down and the reason we have to turn them down is they are coming from the people that you’d expect to be victims of ransomware which are really small businesses that have not invested in basic stuff like good backups and disaster recovery.

And so a ransomware attack becomes a truly business impacting bottom line kind of thing. We’ve seen that with some companies recently like even some larger companies. Just in the past three or four months, our firm has gone into businesses that are larger than you would expect like we are talking global companies where they have been hit by ransomware as well in relatively unprotected sub systems that they have.

And a lot of the incident response has been around, “Oh okay, we haven’t thought about this part of our business or this process by which we do some small but crucial thing that has gone under protected for so long” and we are able to recover from it but also we’re able to get stronger. Those are the happy endings. Those are the ones where I think it’s really quite an instructive thing to have – if you are any good at security, a relatively easy to remediate thing like ransomware.

If you are able to just say, “Okay, let’s just go to pack up and restore things” and then really use the incident as an opportunity to become stronger. To beef up defenses, to beef up right intelligence, to beef up different things that you weren’t thinking about which is why you got hit.

[0:25:19.5] WG: So in terms of closing thoughts, what’s interesting to me about this kind of conversation is that not only is Nick a friend and a colleague of mine for many, many years and I co-author and collaborator but Nick’s a sworn law enforcement agent, he’s a detective and he sees the immediate and the gross impact of these things in the lives of businesses and individuals often and that’s something that I think we often times are estranged from.

Even within the world of incident response in the sense that when you are looking at it I think from the perspective of a law enforcement officer things are different. The perspective is different, the world view is different. As for the tools at your disposal and whether they are legal tools, legislation and things of that nature or mitigation tools versus what we see on the commercial side of things. So I think it’s important to understand that his perspective is one that’s very much from the street.

Which is to use kind of an interesting use of this, maybe a police’s point of view but he’s got that real world granularity that we don’t often see in our space and I would assert to you that many people in the security world do not have because he lives in those, he straddles those boards. So that’s I think an important thing to understand and take away from this conversation is that what he’s talking about is actual real world experience.

And the manifestation of these acts whether they are massive acts of cyber-criminal activity, massive fraud or human trafficking or whether it’s something as that we might tend to trivialize like skimming. You’d say, “Oh skimming is common. You go to the gas pump, you wiggle the credit card” the credit card was sub-tickled to make sure that it’s actually part of the machine and not something that can easily fall off. We know to do that because we are trained to do that.

But the average person may not ever consider that so he sees these things from on a great and small scale I think that’s important. I think secondly that is the gross applicability and the actual activity, right? That the manifestation of these things in the everyday life of everyday individuals almost to the point where people are de-sensitized. Thomas talked about awareness. Now awareness is always a problem and it’s hard enough in the corporate sense of security and where that’s consumed, right?

We talked to businesses but how do you promote awareness to the world population at large? How do you change that or maybe how do you start that dialogue. So that is an important consequence of promoting awareness within cyberspace as it relates to cybercriminal activity and the prevention of exploitation and things of this nature but then of course, I think what’s even further and maybe more interesting to me is the fact that those numbers that were derived from the IC3 report.

The FPS report, the gross number of cases that they are involved with or that they received versus those that they actually open up and actually take action on, what does that tell us about our ability to contend with these threats on a national level? Is this a war of attrition? Are these periods of victories? Where do these things send? So guys, I want you to take a moment to digest that, think your final thoughts and we’ll wrap it up.

[0:28:28.0] NS: I know that when I say this stuff about this report and I’d say 37 investigations out of almost 300,000 complaints. I’m not saying that the FBI is jerking its responsibility. I’m really not, I do think that when resource constraints out I think that a lot of people complain about things that are not really actionable but somewhere the number is still off and somewhere it’s indicative of it and I don’t necessarily think it’s a war of attrition.

But I did, I wrote an article in the Washington Post about this and I said cops, because we are not good at this anyway and cops, there’s one thing about cops. They don’t like not being sure about what to do next and with cyber cops really don’t know what to do next. We just don’t have the training and so if we have an excuse, if we have a reason to say, “Oh I don’t have to work on that” then we’re going to take it and cyber is the poster child for this because the FBI has stood up and said, “Hey we’re the lead cyber agency” so as soon as it has the computer in it, I have an excuse readymade like, “Oh that’s cyber. You’ve got to call the FBI” and this is intensely frustrating for anybody who is a victim.

It is intensely frustrating for anybody who wants to investigate this stuff and intensely frustrating if you see that cybercrime is growing at the rate that it is growing and want to slow it down especially because and I guess this is my last thought.

I think in the arms raised new tools, new threat intelligence, new services, new ways of looking at stuff out there, it is a really sad fact that the low hanging fruit is still really basic stuff and that basic stuff really does – have a lot of destruction in its wake. A lot of financial damage is done by people using very simple tools. You know an incident response we always say if you are being attack by a nation state, they would never send out the A Team if the D Team can get the job done.

Unfortunately in the United States, no one needs to send out the A Team or the B Team because we’re really not that good at this. So I think overall education and improving our defensive posture is super important. I think educating the public about the dangers that they face from really basic threats should take priority right now at least until you get a baseline of training on both the citizen side and the law enforcement side.

[0:30:47.8] TF: Yeah, I think I agree with you Nick. I’d add to that it’s the same just about in every country that I have been to lately and the police forces are overwhelmed by this situation and they’d like to do something. They like to help the public but at the end of the day, it is a problem with resources, manpower and just the sheer volume of things. We are seeing this intensely in Europe. I have been with discussions with people especially in the UK where we’re talking with how do you deal with this with the overwhelming outcome?

We’re talking about data protection as well. When we are talking about data protection in the UK we are a specialized organization called the ICO which takes care of the all complaints against data theft and they can get hundreds of incidents a day and they just don’t know what to do with them because some of them are as simple as, “Oh well my data appeared on a website” versus somewhere which is a lot more serious where a whole bunch of medical records are stolen from a computer in a doctor’s office.

And I agree with you, awareness seems to be a thing. There’s a lot of people doing awareness nowadays. If I were to call is that we should be reaching out to organizations, some of the community organizations that work in infosec to help build that awareness campaign that might be one way of taking like the volunteer aspect getting people in our community to help the police force just to go out and talk to small businesses.

To get them aware and to do things better or to be able to handle to a certain level they’re own protection against these cybercrimes. I mean that could be an important part of how we can progress because the problem is bigger than we can handle it right now, right? We can train as many people as we want but we’re fighting an uphill battle. There is so much going on and there is so many attacks and as you have said it from ransomware all the way up to skimmers.

And skimmers are changing generations as well and now we are seeing very small businesses like the shoeshine guy on the corner who takes credit card payments because he has an iPhone and he can take credit card payments via his iPhone and the whole landscape is changing faster than we can deal with it and faster than most police, most national crime agencies can actually take care of complaints. So that would be my wrap up to this session. It was really great.

[0:33:24.1] WG: Thanks Nick.

[0:33:25.3] NS: Thank you, yeah I appreciate it and actually you guys have GDPR coming and I think that might help with some of the education and as you say about that and one thing I want to mention about skimmers what I was talking about organized retail crime, you know large gangs doing skimmers, the tactics have now changed with actually very well-orchestrated groups that have people with specific roles. These people are distractions and these people are installers and these people are maintainers. It really has come generational, it’s not your dad’s skimmer.

[0:34:04.0] WG: And with that, thanks again for joining us on Episode number nine of the Digital Guardian Podcast and with us today again was our illustrious guest, Mr. Nick Selby. Our next episode will be coming on a couple of weeks, episode number 10, late July and it will feature Dr. Jessica Barker of United Kingdom and we’ll be talking about I believe social engineering and some of the psychological and sociological aspects of profiling and quite actor characterization.

Thomas thanks very much. I know it is getting late on your side of the world, thanks again for being a part of this.

[0:34:37.9] TF: Thank you, it’s good to be here.

[0:34:39.2] WG: Yeah, absolutely. To everyone listening, thank you for your time. We do appreciate it and do send us your feedback. Have a good weekend and safe travels.

[0:34:48.3] NS: Thanks everyone.

Previously on the Digital Guardian Podcast

• Episode 08: The Unsexy Side of Threat Intelligence with Rich Barger
• Episode 07: The Future of Authentication with Wendy Nather
• Episode 06: WannaCry, Patch Management, and Third Party Risk with Dave Lewis
• More